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Abstract 
The main task of a moral economic approach to extreme wealth is to interrogate 
the justifications of the sources of income of the wealthy. By developing and 
applying distinctions between earned and unearned income, and between 
investment that produces development (wealth creation) and 'investment' that 
merely allows wealth extraction, it will be shown that the usual justifications of 
extreme wealth hold little water. It then looks at evidence regarding the sources 
of income of the wealthy and how these have changed. The remarkable return of 
the rich in many countries over the last 30+ years involves a shift not only from 
labour to capital, but from productive capital to rentiership in the financial and 




Thanks in particular to the work of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, it has 
become clear that the rich and super-rich have made an extraordinary comeback 
since the 1970s. This phenomenon is most clear in English speaking countries in 
which neoliberalism, and with it, financialization, have been strongest. As their 
data shows, the proportion of national income received by the top 1% and 
fractions thereof in these countries over the last 100 years follows a U-shaped 
curve, bottoming out in the post-war boom; in the UK it fell from over 18% in the 
1920s to 6% in the 1970s, from which it recovered to over 15% by 2007, 
followed by a temporary dip and then recovery. Sweden and Norway have 
shallower U-shaped curves. Italy, Spain, New Zealand, and Argentina have also 
seen a return of the rich, albeit with more fluctuations. China, of course, has seen 
a dramatic rise in top incomes in recent years. The return of the rich is much 
more limited in France, Denmark and Japan, which have more L-shaped curves. 
In Germany, the share of national income taken by the 1% has stayed fairly flat 
but at a relatively high level since the war. In the Netherlands and Switzerland 
the income shares of the top 1% have fallen since the post-war boom.ii Whereas 
the Great Depression of the inter-war period was accompanied and followed by a 
fall in the proportion of income going to the rich, the recent major recession has 
seen continued accumulation by the 1% and massive and rapid concentration of 
wealth at the top in many countries. In 2014 in the UK, the wealth of the richest 
1000 people totalled £519billion, having grown by over 15% since 2012. (1997 
figure was £98billion). The latest figure is enough to fund the entire National 
Health Service for 4.2 years.iii Danny Dorling has shown that, over a century 
(1910-2009), the shares of total income of those within the different fractions of 
the top 1%  in the UK changed together, and rose and fell in the opposite 
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direction to the shares of the bottom 99%: when the 1% got more, the 99% got 
less (Dorling, 2013). But in the UK, as elsewhere, it is primarily those at the top 
of the 1% who have benefitted most. 
 
Both to explain and to evaluate such changes, we need to identify the sources of 
income received by the rich. Particularly, for the latter we need to adopt a moral 
economic approach to understanding economic activities. By this I mean one that 
examines and assesses the moral justifications of basic features of economic 
organization, in particular property relations and what institutions and 
individuals are allowed and required to do. It treats the economy not merely as a 
machine which sometimes breaks down, but as a complex set of relationships 
between people, increasingly stretched around the world, in which they act as 
producers of goods and services, investors, recipients of various kinds of income, 
lenders and borrowers, and as taxpayers and consumers.  As a critical approach 
it goes beyond the usual focus on irrationality and systemic breakdown, to 
injustice and the moral justifications of taken-for-granted rights and practices. 
It’s not only about how much people in different positions in the economy should 
get paid for what they do, but whether those positions are legitimate in the first 
place. Is it right that they’re allowed to do what they’re doing? One can use the 
term moral economy also to refer to a kind of economy, as Edward Thompson 
famously did, but unlike him, though like many more recent users of the term, I 
regard all economies as moral economies in some respects (Sayer, 2007).iv  
 
A moral economic approach defines economies as systems of provisioning, 
including but going beyond the cash economy. Economic activity provides use-
values, whether material (e.g. food) or immaterial (e.g. school lessons, 
carework), some of which may be commodified, that is, produced for sale. It 
takes seriously the indisputable fact that we all are social beings, dependent on 
others as well as ourselves for our survival and well-being. No-one is or ever was  
‘independently rich’: financial wealth is just a claim upon wealth in terms of use-
values produced by others. Unless there are things for sale, money is worthless, 
and things for sale have to be produced, though not all products need to be 
produced for sale. Production is prior to exchange. 
 
The concerns of moral economy as an approach include the large differences 
between what some are able to get and what they contribute, need and deserve. 
What people should get - a focus of a large literature in political philosophy, 
including John Rawls’ famous A Theory of Justice - is a difficult issue, particularly 
where it’s a matter of what we think people deserve or merit. But what people 
actually get and do in a capitalist economy have little to do with moral 
judgement. Particularly in the case of the rich, it can be shown that what they get 
has more to do with power. I argue that the rich get most of their income by 
using control of assets like land and money to siphon off wealth that others 
produce. Much of their income is unearned. What’s more, over the last 35 years, 
particularly with the increasing dominance of the economy by finance 
(‘financialization’), the rich have become far richer than before by expanding 
these sources of unearned income. But while the distinction between earned and 
unearned income was a staple of classical political economy, socialist thought, 
and taxation policy, it has fallen out of use in the last 35 years - precisely the 
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period in which unearned income has grown. We need, then, to clarify this 
distinction. But first it’s necessary to disambiguate another key term in our 
economic vocabulary: ‘investment’. 
 
I shall start with these matters of definition and then proceed to provide 
evidence for my central claim, that the extraordinary growth of the wealth of the 
rich and super-rich stems from the expansion of unearned income. 
 
Investment 
There is a fundamental and deceptive slippage in the use of the word 
‘investment’. This slippage is central to the legitimation of the rich, and their 
symbolic domination. Investment is invariably understood to be a good thing, 
and can provide an appealing cover for a vast range of activities, yet the term is 
used in two radically different senses: 
 
(1) Use-value/object-oriented definitions focus on what it is that is 
invested in, for example, infrastructure, equipment, or training, that 
enhance what people can do. I.e. it focuses on wealth creation. 
 
(2) Exchange-value/‘investor’-oriented definitions focus on the financial 
gains from any kind of lending, saving, purchase of financial assets or 
speculation – regardless of whether they contribute to any objective 
investment (1), or benefit others. Here the focus is wealth extraction. 
Henceforth I shall use scare quotes for this second meaning of the term. 
 
This is not just an academic distinction: the difference between the two activities 
is of enormous practical importance for both economic growth and wealth 
distribution. 
 
The standard move is to elide the distinction and pass off the second as based on 
the first. Sometimes the two may indeed go together. But it is also perfectly 
possible for successful investments in the first sense to fail to provide financial 
benefits to ‘investors’ in the second sense. The use of my taxes for investing in 
infrastructure on the other side of the country may benefit others but not me. 
Conversely, it is equally possible for lucrative ‘investments’ in the second sense 
to have neutral or negative effects on productive capacity - through, asset 
stripping, value-skimming, and rent-seeking. Elisions of this vital distinction 
have become commonplace not so much through a desire to deceive than 
through ignorance, coupled with the fact that under capitalism individuals have 
little or no interest in checking whether their ‘investments’ (2) have positive, 
neutral or negative effects on the production of goods and services; to the 
rentier-’investor’, £1million from rent is no different from £1million from new 
productive capacity. Further for particular ‘investors’, though not for whole 
economies, purely extractive kinds of ‘investment’ such as speculating on asset 
bubbles can be less risky than objective, wealth-creating investment. 
 
Given the huge difference between these two meanings of the same word, and 
the contingent relation between the practices to which they refer, we must be on 
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The earned-unearned income distinction and its application 
This distinction is fundamental both for understanding economic functions and 
how distribution is determined, and for evaluating such distributions in ethical 
terms. Roughly speaking, earned income is what employees and self-employed 
people get from contributing to the production of goods and services. I don’t 
mean to suggest that the size of their pay reflects what they deserve or 
contribute, but rather that their pay is at least conditional on providing goods 
and services that others can use. The relation between what we might think 
people deserve for their work - however we might want to measure that - and 
the income they actually get is pretty loose, not least because pay levels are 
influenced by power and scarcity rather than such considerations. The goods or 
services they produce and deliver have ‘use-value’, that is, qualities that make 
them useful or desirable, such as the nutritious and tasty quality of a meal, or the 
educational qualities of a maths lesson. Many of these products and services are 
sold in exchange for money in markets, and so have not only use-value but 
‘exchange-value’ and hence are commodities. But many are funded by taxes, 
providing income for state sector workers, such as police officers and school 
teachers. Public sector workers, no less than private sector workers, can produce 
wealth – useful goods and services. These goods and services have costs of 
production – wages and salaries, the care, education, training and support that 
enables people to work, and the costs of producing the materials used in the 
process. Some work has a more indirect relation to the production and 
distribution of goods and services, but is nevertheless necessary for efficient 
provisioning. For example, accounting is needed to monitor and manage the use 
of money and other resources in organisations; an insurance industry is 
important for providing security; and a legal system and police force are needed 
to protect people and property.  
 
By contrast, unearned income derives not from providing goods or services that 
would not otherwise exist and hence incur costs of production, but from 
controlling an already-existing asset, such as land or buildings or spare money, 
that others lack but need or want, and who can therefore be charged for its use. If 
the asset already exists, and there are no further costs of production apart from 
for maintenance, then those who receive income from it do so not because they 
are in any sense ‘deserving’ – they have not contributed anything that did not 
previously exist - but because they can. It is a reflection of power deriving from 
unequal control over existing assets. They use their property not as means of 
production or ‘means of work but as an instrument for the acquisition of gain’ 
(Tawney, 1921, pp.65-6). This is what Ruskin called ‘illth’, deriving from what J. 
A. Hobson later called ‘improperty’ (Ruskin, 1862; Hobson, 1937). In most cases 
they have this power of control by virtue of property rights that legally entitle 
them to use it for extracting payments from others who lack access to such 
assets. Whereas earned income is work-based, unearned income is asset-based. 
In political economy, a person who derives unearned income from ownership of 
existing assets is known as a rentier. 
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Insofar as owners can extract money from others and hence be able to buy goods 
and services without producing goods and services in exchange, then those who 
are producing goods and services must be producing more than they themselves 
consume. In other words, they must be producing a surplus. Mere ownership 
alone produces nothing. The rentier is essentially siphoning off wealth produced 
by others. In turn, this implies that those who rely on earned income are 
generally paid less than the value of what they produce.  
 
The owners of such assets aren’t the only ones who are able to consume without 
contributing to production of use-values, however. Children, the elderly and sick 
and those unable to work also get a kind of unearned income, whether provided 
by families or the state. However, these flows of money are generally called 
‘transfers’ rather than ‘unearned income’ because they are believed – quite 
reasonably - to be accepted as warranted on the basis of needs: producers are 
unlikely to object to having to produce a bit more than they themselves consume 
in order to support them. In practice, just who is deemed entitled to this income 
varies between societies, but it’s generally based on a mixture of recognition of 
others’ needs, love in the case of family members, sense of civic duty, and 
prudent self-interest (in providing a safety net, should things go wrong). The 
prime justification is usually that the recipients are needy and cannot reasonably 
be expected to work for an income, or that there are insufficient jobs for them, 
and that unemployment and ill-health can happen to anyone. As always, which 
transfers are undertaken by the state’s taxation and spending depends of course 
on the politics and balance of power in the country concerned.  
 
But while the transfers that they get are relatively easy to justify, the unearned 
income of adult, able-bodied rentiers is unwarranted and undeserved. They free-
ride on the labour of others. The term “free-riding” both denotes a particular 
kind of economic social relation and raises ethical objections to it. This relation 
between rentiers and producers is indisputably a social relation, one that is 
exploitative and an important generator of inequality in its own right. It is a 
relation that has become increasingly complex and globalized, so that British 
rentiers, for example, siphon off wealth produced by workers not only in Britain 
but in many other countries. Let us now examine the main sources of 
unwarranted, or asset-based unearned income, starting with the classical trio of 
rent, interest and profit. 
 
The clearest case of the rentier is the landowner. The mere ownership of land or 
buildings does not make it any more productive, and while it can be claimed that 
improvements to them should be paid for because they involve production costs 
and produce enhanced goods, pure rent is not payment for production but 
merely for access; as Tawney observed, rent is like a private tax on the industry 
of others (Tawney, 1921). Sources of rent other than land and property, such as 
intellectual property also provide rentier income – income based on power 
rather than contribution. 
 
Interest on loans is a charge for the use an existing asset – money – which 
functions as a claim on the labour and products of others. However, banks do not 
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merely act as intermediaries between savers and borrowers by lending their 
existing deposits, but create new credit money, simply by writing deposits into 
the accounts of borrowers; the interest they charge far exceeds any production 
costs in creating the credit money (Hudson, 2011; Mellor, 2010). Deregulation 
has allowed them a freer hand in doing this. Lending that fuelled asset price 
bubbles was a major component of the 2007 credit crunch, and has had 
important effect on shifting patterns of economic inequalities, enriching the 
asset-rich at the expense of the asset-poor (Engelen et al, 2011). For Marx, it was 
primarily those who made money out of money –‘interest-bearing capital’ – who 
made up ‘the class of parasites’ (Marx, 1972, p. 545). A moral economic critique 
of interest situates it in an unequal social relation – usury – in which the lender is 
typically in a stronger position than the borrower. Although interest payments 
are taken for granted in contemporary capitalism, outside the formal economy, 
they are seen as unjust. If we are in financial difficulties and ask a friend for a 
loan, we would be outraged if they said yes but only on condition that we paid 
interest and agreed to release our assets as collateral should we not be able to 
repay. It would be perfectly clear to us that they were taking advantage of our 
weakness. The injustice of this asymmetry has been the focus of critiques of 
usury for millennia (Graeber, 2011; Pettifor 2006). 
 
In classical political economy, profit is the third member of this trio of sources of 
unearned income. The profits of private (productive) employers derive from 
their ownership of the means of production and the product, and the 
dependency of non-owners of means of production on them for employment. 
Pure capitalists – that is ones who just own their firms and delegate management 
to others – are not contributing to wealth creation, but merely using their power 
relative to those of propertyless workers to appropriate the difference between 
costs and the value of what the workers (and managers) produce. Their income 
is unearned. In these respects, pure capitalists profiting merely from owning 
businesses producing goods and services look very much like rentiers. But 
there’s also a difference. Even though their income is unearned, it has a ‘saving 
grace’: it is at least dependent on supporting productive activity. While, like 
rentiers, pure capitalists also depend on this surplus for their profit, they are also 
instrumental in making the generation of that surplus possible, and can only 
make a profit as long as they do.  What is remarkable, though unremarked 
because it has become normalised with the establishment of capitalist property 
rights, is that the employees who produce the goods and services have no rights 
over the revenue that comes from the sale of their output, and no say in what 
happens to it.  
 
For working capitalists, those who are not only owners but managers, their 
income is a mixture of both earned and unearned. In practice, the distinction 
between employee managers and capitalists and rentiers can be blurred by 
giving them shares. As organized labour has weakened and delivering 
shareholder value has become a priority, top managers have been able to use 




Shares provide another major source of unearned income. Since well over 97 per 
cent of share transactions are in the secondary market, only in a tiny proportion 
of cases does the money paid for them go to the company, and thus might be 
claimed to be a payment for contributing to any objective productive investment. 
The extraordinary feature of share ownership is not so much limited liability (for 
losses made by the company) but that it provides a potentially indefinite source 
of unearned income - an unlimited asset. Both dividends and gains from trading 
shares are important sources of unearned income. Since growth of demand for 
shares has exceeded the growth of supply in recent decades, average prices have 
tended to rise too, creating bubbles, so this source has proved lucrative (Engelen 
et al, 2011). The development over the last 30 years of the shareholder value 
movement – a highly successful rentier campaign – coupled with the weakening 
of trade unions, has made share prices the primary concern of the management 
of companies. Firms that fail to deliver rising share prices – for example, by 
ploughing most of their profits into productive investment instead of distributing 
them as dividends – are disciplined by the market for companies as they become 
vulnerable to takeover by managements that will deliver shareholder value. 
Particularly in the light of the power of uncommitted, absentee shareholders, 
what is remarkable - though unremarked because it has become normalised with 
the establishment of capitalist property rights - is that the employees who 
produce the goods and services have no control over the revenue that comes 
from the sale of their output. A relevant moral economic question is what is the 
justification for this extraordinary difference between the position of workers – 
dependent and committed – and that of owners who are usually uncommitted 
and have contributed little or nothing to the work of the organisation? 
 
The financial boom and crisis owed much to unearned income from speculation 
on an ever-growing range of financial assets, and from burgeoning tax avoidance, 
even as taxes on capital fell. Many in the sector have made their money by 
arranging major transactions such as mergers and takeovers, involving many 
millions of pounds, and taking a small percentage commission. It is in their 
interest to promote as many transactions as possible. In effect, they are standing 
‘close to a big till’,v and it is easy for them to put their hands in it without 
breaking any laws; the income reflects position rather than contribution. Erturk 
et al call this ‘value-skimming’ and argue that the financial intermediaries have 
been a major but hidden beneficiary of financialization, overlooked by those who 
limit their gaze to bankers or CEOs. High-income but largely anonymous 
financial intermediaries far outnumber the much-publicised CEOs; Savage and 
Williams estimate that in the City of London there are circa 15,000 senior 
intermediaries employed at a principal or partner level in investment banking, 
hedge funds and other kinds of trading and private equity (as well as those 
providing support services in law and accounting) (Savage and Williams, 2008). 
 
Contemporary mainstream economists are of course likely to object to this 
account. One of the things financial systems, whether privately or publicly run, 
are supposed to do is move underused or idle resources, particularly savings, to 
where they can be used more productively, thereby promoting ‘allocational 
efficiency’. The money made by those who do this is supposedly a reward for 
enabling this. However, this definition is frequently used as a cover for a quite 
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different version of allocational efficiency that is specific to capitalism, in which 
the allocation of resources among competing ends is according to where 
expected rates of financial return are highest. This could be where labour is most 
exploitable, where consumer incomes are highest, where prospects for 
extracting rent are best, or where asset inflation is highest (for example, the 
latest bubble), or where taxation is lowest. It could be logging in Sumatra, or 
mining in Peru, or luxury apartments in London, or buying up land in Africa to 
rent out, or buying shares, bonds or other financial instruments.  
 
 
Sources of the wealth of the rich 
So far I have sketched out the main sources of unearned income involving wealth 
extraction, but I have yet to show that they are the main source of the wealth of 
the rich. The relative enrichment over the last 35 years of the top 1% or 0.1% of 
individuals in the income distribution gives us something to explain but says 
nothing about the sources of their income. While there is no single source of 
evidence that covers this comprehensively, a consistent picture emerges from a 
variety of sources. 
 
It might be thought that one could just define wages and salaries as earned 
income and subtract them from total income, to get unearned income – receipts 
of rent, interest, profit, capital gains and speculative gains. But in contemporary 
economies many of the richest get most of their income in salaries. This makes it 
appear that rentier-dominated economies are a thing of the past, because now 
‘the working rich’ make up most of the rich and super-rich. But this approach 
seriously underestimates unearned income as we have defined it, and hence the 
extent of rentiership. The reason for this is that some people get a salary for 
performing wealth extraction activities for rentier organizations.vi So although 
their income comes in the form of salary and is recorded as such, it is actually 
rent or interest or profit from mere ownership, etc., at one remove. Property 
companies and banks, particularly ‘investment’ banks and much of the rest of the 
financial sector are prime examples of organizations most of whose activities fit 
this description. And as many commentators have noted, it is particularly in 
these (FIRE) sectors that the astonishing growth in incomes, including salaries, 
at the top has occurred. Further, in the last 30 years, many non-finance 
companies, from cars to public utilities, have made more money by getting 
involved in rentier activities in the financial sector than in their traditional 
sectors, so these increasingly supplement the incomes of the ‘working rich’ in 
these sectors too. 
 
Over the years 1979-2012, the top 1% of US households increased their real 
incomes by 185%, the top 0.1% by 384%, and the top 0.01% by 685%, while 
those of the vast majority of the rest stagnated (Sayer, 2014, p.x).vii To say the 
least, it would stretch credulity to claim that this growth of top incomes reflected 
equivalent increases in their economic contributions. While the share of national 
income going to workers over the last 35 years has fallen in many countries, 
labour productivity continued to rise, so ‘jobless growth’ predominated. 
According to Tom Palley ‘wages of U.S. production and non-supervisory workers 
(who constitute over 80 percent of employment) have become detached from 
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productivity growth during the era of financialisation’ (Palley, 2007). In the UK 
the divergence between pay and productivity started later, in the 1990s, and was 
less dramatic but still marked. Again, only the pay of those at or near the top of 
the income distribution kept up with economic growth. The weakening of trade 
unions and employment protection has hit those in the bottom half of the income 
distribution hardest; the decline in trade union membership correlates with the 
rising income shares of the top 1% (Oxfam, 2014). In so far as there has been an 
expansion of employment, it is because a larger proportion of jobs are part time, 
and low paid, and there has been a rapid growth of self-employment – more 
likely to be a sign of precarity than security (Buchanan et al, 2013). 
 
Several studies have revealed similar if not quite so dramatic patterns in a large 
number of countries: 
 In a study of 13 western capitalist countries, John Peters found that while 
workers achieved a 4% growth in real wages in the 1970s, growth in real 
wages from 1980 to 2005 was less than 1%, though those employed in 
the financial sector did better. In the 1970s and 1980s the wage share of 
national income in these countries peaked at 78%, but then declined to 
63% in 2005 while income from profits, stock dividends, interest and 
rents rose (Peters, 2010; see also Perrons, 2012). 
 Tali Kristal’s 2009 study of labour’s share of national income in 16 
capitalist democracies arrived at ‘an unequivocal conclusion. Since the 
early 1980s there has been a large and persistent decline in labor’s share 
of national income in most capitalist democracies. The growth of 
productivity has expanded total income, but in many countries average 
real wages and fringe benefits have increased more slowly than labor 
productivity. Meanwhile, income growth has occurred mainly in 
capitalists’ profits, sharply increasing capital’s share.’viii 
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
commented: ‘In developed countries, the share of labour income declined, 
falling by 5 percentage points or more between 1980 and 2006–2007 – 
just before the global financial crisis – in Australia, Belgium, Finland, 
France, the Netherland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and by 10 points or more in Austria, Germany, Ireland, New 
Zealand and Portugal. In several major economies (including France, 
Germany, Italy and the United States), a significant proportion of the 
decline in the share of wages had already occurred between 1980 and 
1995. This appears to have been linked to a departure from the post-war 
social consensus, when wage increases closely followed productivity 
gains (UNCTAD, 2012, p.52). 
 The International Labour Organization (ILO) found that between the early 
1990s and 2007, labour’s share of income fell in 51 out of the 73 countries 
for which data was available. More specifically, labour’s share of value 
added fell by 13% in Latin America, 10% in Asia and the Pacific and 9% in 
high-income countries. The gap between the top and bottom 10% of 
waged and salaried workers increased in 70% of countries in this survey 
(ILO, 2008).ix 
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 Both UNCTAD and the ILO show that in most developed countries, 
especially English-speaking ones, income from capital gains (unearned 
income) has gone increasingly to the rich.x 
 Reports from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Oxfam also 
show a widening of inequalities in most countries, with the rich pulling 
away from the rest (IMF, 2008, p.168).xi 
 
But is this increasing proportion of income going to those at the top a reflection 
of an increase in their contribution to wealth creation, rather than simply 
increased wealth extraction? Some argue that recent technological change has 
favoured higher-paid workers who have the necessary skills, but, as the 
exhaustive analyses of Thomas Piketty show, if this were the case one would 
expect wage shares across the top 10 or 20% to have increased, when in fact 
increases have been heavily concentrated in the top 1% (Piketty, 2014). And 
when we look at the sectors in which the rich are concentrated – finance and real 
estate – it is clear that the ‘earnings’ of many of ‘the working rich’ come from 
interest, rent-seeking and value-skimming, albeit paid out as salaries and share 
options. Particularly between 2000 and 2008, an increasing share of growth was 
taken as profit by owners and shareholders, contributing further to the 
divergence of wages and productivity growth (Resolution Foundation, 2012). 
 
Interest payments yield unearned income for lenders, and since lenders tend to 
be richer than borrowers, interest filters up to the top. In Britain, Hodgson has 
estimated that only the top 10% get more in interest then they pay out, and 
within them it’s the 1% who get most (Hodgson, 2013).xii In Germany, the bottom 
80% of people in the income distribution pay out far more interest on loans and 
hidden in the prices of goods than they get back on savings – not surprisingly, for 
as elsewhere few of them can afford to save much. Those in the next 10% get 
roughly as much interest as they pay out, while those in the top 10% get more 
than they pay out, and within that group the richest of course enjoy the biggest 
surplus (Kennedy, 2012). 
 
All this is consistent with the argument, made by David Harvey, that there has 
been a shift from the primary circuit of capital (centred on the production of 
goods and services) to the secondary circuit of capital in which capital is 
‘invested’ in assets such as land, property, loans, shares, and a vast range of 
financial instruments (Harvey, 2007). This shift, which began in the 1970s, 
occurred partly because profit margins were being squeezed in the primary 
sector, due to a combination of increased competition from cheap labour 
countries and strong labour organization in many sectors in the old 
industrialised countries. Meanwhile, the growth of private pensions ‘invested’ in 
financial products by pension funds and other major harvesters of the savings of 
the middle classes increased demand for them. But whereas growing demand for 
everyday products like pizzas and mobile phones prompts increased supply, the 
same is not true for many key financial assets. Corporations are generally 
reluctant to issue new shares, because this risks lowering their share prices, and 
indeed many have spent more on buying back their own shares than on real 
investment, so increased demand for them has driven up their prices – and with 
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that, top managers’ bonuses. Land and property in central locations is also 
inherently scarce, unless one builds upwards, and property companies have no 
interest in stopping the inflation of land and property values by building enough 
to meet demand. Privatization of public utilities also creates lucrative sources of 
rent from the control of water and energy; as James Meek puts it, our need for 
these things has been turned into ‘a human revenue stream’ (Meek, 2012).  
These can in turn be securitized and the income paid out as dividends used as 
ways for the companies to load up with debt and avoid tax (Allen and Pryke, 
2013). The ‘working rich’ in these companies are the chief beneficiaries of this 
shift towards rentiership. 
 
‘Wealth’, in the financial sense, covers many things but is typically defined as 
total stock of a person’s assets minus liabilities. While for most of the 99% their 
wealth, from homes to clothes, is a stock of use-values, for the 1% and 
particularly those at the top, most of their wealth is primarily an ‘investment’, 
used to gain income from ownership of capital assets, via interest, dividends, 
profits, and capital gains. And as Thomas Piketty shows, in many countries, 
wealth from these sources has been increasing faster than from others sources – 
primarily wages and salaries – in the neoliberal era. In fact, looking back over a 
century, the half century from 1920s to the 1970s was an anomaly in capitalist 
history because it was the only time when the ratio of wealth from these sources 
relative to total income fell significantly. It happened as a result of the growing 
strength of labour and the destruction of capital, particularly in the Second 
World War. Since then the rate of growth of unearned income (not a term Piketty 
makes much use of) has exceeded the rate of economic growth, resulting in rapid 
wealth concentration at the top, at the expense of the majority of the population. 
Provided the rich ‘invest’ most of their money rather than spend it on 
consumption, this process will continue, and, as one would expect, the richer 
they are the higher their marginal propensity to ‘invest’. This concentration of 
wealth means that the children of the wealthy, already advantaged through no 
effort of their own, will inherit huge windfalls – the purest case of unearned 
income. (Bequests might seem like transfers, as they’re gifts, but they differ in 
that they are not based on need; in fact, given that the children of the rich receive 
far more than others, they are inversely related to need.) As Piketty notes this 
means we are returning to an ‘inheritance society’ in which there is not only a 
very high concentration of wealth but large fortunes are passed from generation 
to generation and social mobility is restricted (Piketty, p.351). In France, he 
estimates that inherited wealth already accounts for a fifth of household 
monetary resources, and is rising fast.xiii  
 
 
Other moral economic critiques of extreme wealth 
Although I have concentrated on the sources of the wealth of the rich, a moral 
economic critique of their wealth could go beyond this, to include the effects on 
the distribution of political power, their consumption patterns, and 




As regards the political aspects, the massive concentration of wealth over the last 
35 years has been both cause and consequence of a shift in political power to the 
rich. In any capitalist economy, those who control the commanding heights of the 
economy have a structural source of power deriving precisely from this control, 
which makes governments dependent on them for delivering economic growth. 
In the neoliberal era this hidden power has been augmented through the 
weakening of the power of organised labour, as already mentioned. But in 
addition to the shift in power from labour to capital there has been a shift within 
capital towards that which dominates the secondary circuit, particularly finance, 
and with that rentier capitalism. By constructing a narrative of success and 
modernity, by lobbying, by dominating the media, by buying support through 
political donations, and infiltrating government and designing policies that suit 
its interests, this new financial plutocracy has huge influence on political 
agendas. Its most brilliant coup has been to offload the costs of its financial crisis 
onto the 99%, and the blame onto the public sector.  Its next coup is likely to be 
pushing through bold new trade treaties that allow big capital to override 
legislation approved by democratic governments that limits its power. These are 
the Trans-Pacific Pact (TTP), involving 12 nations round the Pacific Rim,xiv and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) involving the US and 
28 European Union states. Together they account for 60% of global output. Any 
state that tries to impose restrictions on capital, say, to protect the environment 
or protect labour and human rights, regulate finance or and keep its public 
sector public or restrict the growth of corporate property rights is liable to be 
sued by an closed international court. Few elected politicians have been allowed 
access to the negotiations or even information about their details. ‘Investor–state 
dispute settlement’ mechanisms are to be used to allow big corporations to sue 
governments before secretive arbitration panels composed of corporate lawyers, 
bypassing domestic courts and overriding the will of parliaments. This 
represents a huge victory for plutocracy over democracy. The increased political 
power of capital committed to increasing its already bloated unearned income is 
truly a force to be reckoned with.  
 
As regards consumption, it has again to be remembered that financial wealth 
constitutes a potential claim on the goods and services produced as commodities 
by others. Unless the latter are produced, the wealth is worthless. Thus, a 
relevant moral economic question might be what justification is there for the 
work of so many to be controlled by the consumption preferences of so few? One 
way of thinking about how much concentration of wealth should be allowed is to 
ask how many people’s labour and pay should be dependent on meeting the 
consumption desires of the rich and super-rich? Carlos Slim Helu (net ‘worth’ 
$87 billion, in 2014), for many years the richest man in the world, owns 90% of 
the telephone landlines in Mexico, and 80% of the mobile phone networks, an 
extraordinary politically mediated windfall of economic rent (Thompson, 
2006).xv His income in 2012 was equivalent to the average annual salary of 
400,000 Mexicans (Freeland, 2012). If he were to spend it all on consumption 
one can imagine how large the disproportion would be between production for 
and production for his benefit. Such inequalities in what people are able to 
consume creates a massive misallocation of resources, in which the production 
of exclusive luxuries takes precedence over production for the needs and wants 
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of the vast majority of population, particularly the poor. Increased consumption 
by the rich can actually make others worse off: in London, purchase of properties 
as ‘investments’ by the rich not only allows them both to drive up and free-ride 
on rising land values, but makes it increasingly difficult for many who work in 
the capital to live there. 
 
Finally, as regards the environment, a moral economic approach would question 
the legitimacy of allowing any to consume more than their share of the earth’s 
resources, ie. the world’s resources divided by the world’s population? To be 
sure, some may need to consume more than others, for example, people in cold 
countries need more fuel for heating and insulation than those in hot countries. 
But in practice, of course, the distribution is not determined by deliberation but 
by power; why should we assume that the distribution resulting from a free-for-
all in which those who control key assets can extract wealth from others must be 
acceptable? This kind of question is particularly urgent as carbon emissions 
continue to accumulate, rapidly approaching the point where runaway global 
warming takes off. Why should anyone be allowed to produce more green house 
gases from their activities than the earth’s capacity to reabsorb it (already 
massively exceeded) divided by the world’s population? But it is not just that the 
carbon footprints of rich individuals are so excessive, but that insofar as their 
wealth depends on continued exponential economic growth, so they can get a 
return on their ‘investments’, they have an interest in doing nothing about 
climate change. Energy companies – amongst the most powerful corporations in 
the world - are continuing their long-term investment in fossil fuels, and the 




Much could be added to this explanation of the growth of rentiership, of 
unearned income based on control of assets, in particular changes in global 
economic geography. There is also a cultural side to it, as neoliberalism has 
infiltrated ever deeper into organizational and everyday life, changing 
behaviours and worldviews. Part of this in turn has been the piecemeal 
development of narratives celebrating ‘the market’ and its ‘Masters of the 
Universe’ and encouraging the financialization of everyday lifexvi – through 
exhortations to ‘release the value’ of our homes’,  become ‘entrepreneurial 
selves’, ‘leveraging our skillsets’. It also ‘moralized’ neoliberalism with a 
discourse of ‘wealth creation’, ‘trickle down effects’, the rich as job creators - 
specially gifted individuals who we should admire and thank. Ordinary people 
have been encouraged to see themselves as responsible only for themselves, 
rather than interdependent, while marketing and managerial discourse strives to 
create optimism - a ‘cruel optimism’xvii - in the face of job insecurity, massive 
youth unemployment and prohibitive housing costs. 
 
Many academics and other observers have become fascinated with the challenge 
of understanding the extraordinary complex and arcane practices of 
financialization – often with a sense of dismay at the way the sector has come to 
function as master rather than servant of the economy. Many have pointed out 
how dysfunctional it is to have economies in which the falling share of wealth 
 14 
held by the 99% results in stagnation of demand and hence reduced capacity for 
paying debt. But the economy is not just a devilishly complex and flawed 
machine: while it certainly is dysfunctional and contradictory, it is also a set of 
social relations and there is a danger of missing the injustice of this wealth 
concentration, insofar as comes from unearned income, from a massive increase 
in free-riding. Similarly, debts piled up into the future can only be repaid if the 
output produced by future generations grows fast enough. Given the size of the 
debt crisis, this is clearly an impossibility. More importantly, in a world on the 
brink of runaway global warming, resumed growth in countries with already 
massively unsustainable carbon footprints is madness – again not only 
dysfunctional, but unjust in damaging the environment of poorer countries and 
future generations. Hence the need for a moral economic approach that 
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